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too confident in their “abortion choice” beliefs. Wherever the truth lies in 
this contentious matter, it is not to be found in association with the easy 
conscience over the practice of abortion that characterizes so many in our 
culture. We may hope, therefore, that Beckwith’s book will prick a con-
science or two. The abortion debate should not go away and Beckwith has 
made a significant contribution to seeing that it doesn’t.
Developmental Theism: From Pure will to Unbounded Love by Peter Forrest. 
Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. 199. $55 (cloth).
DANIeL DOMbrOwSkI, Seattle University
Both the existence and the concept of God are examined in this thought-
provoking book. The author’s treatment of the existence of God is built 
foursquare on a philosophical anthropology. There is a spectrum of phil-
osophical positions regarding what human beings are: reductive mate-
rialism sees consciousness and agency (the mental) as redundant of the 
physical; moderate materialism sees the mental as nonredundant of the 
physical, but as nonetheless correlated with the physical in a metaphysi-
cally necessary fashion; moderate idealism sees the physical as nonre-
dundant of the mental, but as nonetheless correlated with the mental in a 
metaphysically necessary fashion; reductive idealism sees the physical as 
redundant of the mental; and, of course, dualism sees the mental and the 
physical as correlated only contingently.
Forrest thinks that the probability of theism is negligible only if we are 
almost certain of reductive materialism. That is, we have good reason to 
be theists. But the author does not so much think that we should be confi-
dent theists as we should not be confident atheists.
Among the options in philosophical anthropology listed in the first 
paragraph, it is moderate materialism that Forrest defends, a position that 
coheres with theism better than its chief rival, dualism. Because of the cur-
rent dominance of materialism in philosophy, he thinks that philosophical 
theists should pay attention to a type of theism that is built on a moderate 
materialist basis. One beneficial consequence of a theism that is built on 
moderate materialism is that it avoids talking of miraculous intervention 
into the natural world by a supernatural God. It is precisely this sort of 
talk that often prevents philosophical theists from getting a fair hearing. 
(Forrest’s previous book was titled God without the Supernatural: A Defense 
of Naturalistic Theism.)
Most of the book, however, concerns not the existence of God, but the 
concept of God. God changes, on Forrest’s view, such that the history of re-
ligious thought can exhibit genuine, if uneven, progress just as the history 
of scientific thought can do so. Although he acknowledges that many of 
his views are like those of Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, 
and David Ray Griffin (indeed, he calls his position neoclassical theism, 
which is a Hartshornian commonplace), he does not really engage with 
process thinkers is any significant way. Rather, he reaches his conclusions 
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via dialectical exchanges with Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams, Brian 
Leftow, and other analytic philosophers.
Forrest rejects not only the orthodox view that God is in every respect 
unchanging, he also rejects the orthodox view that God is a strictly spiri-
tual being with no material embodiment. Like Whitehead, Hartshorne, 
and Griffin, he rejects the nondevelopmental God of classical theism, and 
like Hartshorne and Griffin, he defends the concept of a panentheistic God 
who is the World Soul, the soul not for this or that particular body, but for 
the whole embodied world.
There are also notable differences from process thinkers, in fact from 
both classical and neoclassical theists. In some respects Forrest’s view is 
sui generis. For example, his concept of God is one wherein the “Primor-
dial God” is initially all powerful but unloving. Once God creates natural 
laws and free creatures, however, God is thereby limited by these cre-
ations. But this is not a total loss in that God gradually acquires a loving 
character in response to creaturely joys and sufferings. Thus, Forrest’s de-
velopmental theism traces the movement from a God who was initially 
omnipotent but not omnibenevolent to one who is omnibenevolent but 
not omnipotent. (By contrast, Hartshorne’s God is consistently omnibe-
nevolent in responding to creaturely suffering and consistently exhibits 
ideal—if not omnipotent—power.)
However odd this view seems at first to classical theists and even to 
other neoclassical theists, it is certainly worth taking the ride with For-
rest through his witty, nuanced, and insightful treatments of what love is 
(whether human or divine), of why nonhuman animals suffer, and of why 
his view of theism is the simplest theistic hypothesis. This is the sort of 
book that amply rewards the reader for his or her efforts. At no point does 
one get the impression that Forrest is engaging in a strictly “academic” en-
terprise in the pejorative sense. And despite the heterodox nature of some 
of the author’s conclusions, he heroically tries to show how his views help 
to clarify traditional problems surrounding the trinity, real presence in the 
eucharist, and the Chalcedonian account of the incarnation. His heterodox 
conclusions grow out of thoroughly orthodox concerns and problems.
The Primordial God’s “fission” into three persons obviously leads to 
relations among these three persons, but, according to Forrest, these are 
not necessarily loving relations. Rather, God acquires a loving character 
only after free creatures are created, whose joys and sufferings, and the 
divine responses to such joys and sufferings, enable God to increasingly 
become a loving agent. God grows into an omnibenevolent being. For-
rest’s view seems to be that before the creaturely joys and sufferings were 
experienced by God there was little opportunity for God to acquire any 
character at all, much less a loving one.
God’s moral growth, he thinks, is the flip side of God’s kenotic abdica-
tion of power. This is for two reasons. “In the beginning” God surveys all 
the possible worlds that could be created, but once the natural laws that 
govern some particular world are in place they have a force that not even 
God can completely overturn. Analogously, once God creates libertarian 
free creatures, divine power is like Swiss cheese, on Forrest’s account, in 
that creaturely power to choose makes a hole in the divine efficacy. And 
it is only these kenotic abandonments of omnipotent power, he thinks, 
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that make possible the growth of divine love. In this regard Forrest seems 
closer to “open” theists like Clark Pinnock than to process theists.
It seems to me that Forrest paradoxically grants both too much and 
too little power to God. First, he grants too much power to God when he 
claims that the Primordial God is omnipotent. Forrest himself admits that 
at the first moment of time God was not entirely alone in that abstract enti-
ties (such as universals, logical truths, and so on), which exist necessarily, 
would have been there to condition divine power. Presumably not even 
God can violate the law of noncontradiction; hence, not even God is om-
nipotent. And second, it seems to me that Forrest grants too little power to 
God when he says that, once God creates free agents, God thereby chooses 
to have no power whatsoever over them. It is not clear that the freedom 
of the creatures is violated if God has persuasive power over them by way 
of providing ideals to them and offering them a model of perfection. It is 
only coercive divine power over the creatures that threatens their libertar-
ian freedom, or so it could be argued.
Neoclassical (i.e., process) theists will surely welcome this book, de-
spite their disagreement with some parts of it. It is to be hoped that classi-
cal theists who are also analytic philosophers will also read it in that they 
are its intended audience.
One excellent feature of the book that should be of interest to theists of 
all stripes is its treatment of aesthetics, broadly conceived so as to include 
an account of pleasurable or painful feeling, from the ancient Greek word 
for feeling, aisthesis. Why did God create the world that was, in fact, cre-
ated? Forrest’s response to this question is in terms of a theory of “hedonic 
tone.” This theory supports the claim that aesthetics, in a way, precedes 
both ethics and metaphysics. Primitive feelings of joy are presupposed by 
consequentialists who seek to maximize these, just as primitive sufferings 
are presupposed by the effort to minimize these both in human society 
and among sentient beings in general. On Forrest’s account, divine beauty 
seems to consist in both God’s ability to bring our world into existence and 
to lovingly respond to creaturely joys and sufferings once it gets going. 
Divine beauty, it seems, becomes apparent to us when we try to view the 
cosmos as a valuable whole and in the long run. Consequentialism actu-
ally supports a theistic worldview.
Unfortunately, Forrest denigrates perfect being theology, whether 
found in classical theists like Katherin Rogers or in a neoclassical theist 
like (myself or) Hartshorne. The Anselmian effort to reach clarity regard-
ing that than which no greater can be conceived is criticized by Forrest 
because, although God may become perfectly loving over time, such per-
fection is not there from the beginning. That is, what is really distinctive 
about the author’s approach is not that he is a developmental theist, but 
that he denies that what we mean by “God” is a being that is by its very 
nature perfect.
I would be remiss if I did not mention in closing that there is not the 
slightest hint of dogmatism in the book. Throughout the book Forrest is 
genuinely interested in productive dialectical exchange with fellow the-
ists. It would be a mistake, I think, for philosophical theists to put this 
book at the bottom of their reading lists.
